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Abstract: As a comment on India after the publication of 
Midnight’s Children, Salman Rushdie’s 1995 novel The Moor’s Last 
Sigh offers a broad-based critique of modern India within the con-
text of economic policy shifts that followed the country’s inde-
pendence from British rule in 1947. The gradual implementation 
of neoliberal economic policies in the 1980s and 1990s accom-
panied India’s emergence as a major player in the global capitalist 
economy but also led to drastic increases in income inequality, 
unemployment, and the proliferation of a vast informal sector of 
exploitable human capital. Rushdie’s novel identifies India’s entre-
preneurial and capitalist classes, specifically in Mumbai/Bombay, 
as complicit in the exacerbation of the class disparity that has led, 
in many cases, to increased cultural tensions between Hindus 
and Muslims as well as the growing ubiquity of government cor-
ruption and organized crime. The novel offers additional insight 
into the exploitative logic of Hindu nationalist politics through 
its parodic depiction of the Shiv Sena party, which derives much 
of its political clout through its patriarchal, mafia-esque relation-
ship with urban slum dwellers. The Moor’s Last Sigh delineates new 
and complex forms of oppression and exploitation in postcolo-
nial India that often occur simultaneously along class and cultural 
lines.
Keywords: neoliberalism, globalization, wageless life, Salman 
Rushdie, The Moor’s Last Sigh
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In January 2012, Salman Rushdie tweeted his disappointment about 
cancelling an impending trip to the Jaipur Literature Festival in India: 
“Very sad not to be at Jaipur,” he wrote. “I was told bombay mafia don 
issued weapons to 2 hitmen to ‘eliminate’ me. Will do video link in-
stead. Damn.” The assassins of whom Rushdie spoke presumably worked 
for Dawood Ibrahim, a notorious Bombay-based Muslim crime boss 
with “the same resonance in India as Osama bin Laden has in the US” 
(former Indian Deputy Prime Minister L. K. Advani qtd. in Clarke 50).1 
Nearly twenty-three years after the initial publication of The Satanic Verses 
(1989), Rushdie found himself yet again living in the shadow of the infa-
mous fatwa Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini issued against him for authoring 
the novel. As head of the international crime syndicate D-Company, 
Ibrahim’s ties to Al Qaeda, Pakistani terror group Lakshar-e-Taiba, and 
the Taliban have inflected his illicit business dealings throughout India in 
recent years, particularly “Supari Commerce,” or contract killing (Clarke 
48–50). It seems that Rushdie’s decision to abort his trip was sound.
Rushdie’s most recent brush with Bombay’s criminal underworld was 
not his first. The Moor’s Last Sigh (1995), his first major post-fatwa liter-
ary effort, contains a jarring depiction of the 1993 Bombay bombings, 
which Ibrahim is widely believed to have masterminded. The attacks, 
which strategically targeted highly visible locations throughout the 
metropole such as the Bombay Stock Exchange, the Air India Building, 
and the Sahar International Airport, killed hundreds of innocent civil-
ians across the city. Many viewed the attacks as a response to anti-Mus-
lim riots and pogroms following the destruction of the Babri Mosque 
at Ayodhya months earlier at the hands of the Hindu fundamentalist 
Baratiya Janata Party. Ibrahim’s alleged involvement continues to raise 
a particularly pressing set of concerns. Until the attacks, his business 
interests were relatively secular. Hindus and Muslims had always co-
existed within D-Company’s ranks and Ibrahim’s net worth of $430 
million was largely dependent on a vast networked underworld that 
operated across communal divides and national borders, including deal-
ings with the Pakistani military establishment (Lal 297). What caused 
D-Company’s abrupt ideological shift? For Rollie Lal, the organization’s 
involvement in the bombings demonstrated how organized crime net-
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works can become radicalized over time and, beyond “tactical alliances 
of convenience,” function as crucial sources of financial support for ter-
rorist groups (293). The key notion here, and one that raises further and 
more urgent questions, is that of financial support: how and why did 
D-Company amass its fortune and why was it suddenly using its wealth 
to sponsor terrorist attacks? 
Rushdie was certainly aware of these revelations while writing The 
Moor’s Last Sigh, and as the novel’s protagonist, Moraes “Moor” Zogoiby, 
witnesses the horror of the attacks, he expresses concerns that his father, 
international business mogul Abraham, is behind them. Comparisons 
between Abraham and Ibrahim are intriguing, especially considering 
Rushdie’s propensity to caricature larger-than-life political and cul-
tural figures such as Indira Gandhi (Midnight’s Children), Margaret 
Thatcher (The Satanic Verses), and Bal Thackeray (The Moor’s Last Sigh). 
“Ibrahim” is Arabic for the Hebrew “Abraham.” Although Rushdie’s fic-
tional Abraham hails from the Jewish enclaves of Cochin, he is partially 
Muslim; his heritage is tied to an illegitimate son of the last Moorish 
Sultan of Grenada, Boabdil. Both Abraham and Ibrahim initiated lu-
crative business careers through smuggling, either spices (Abraham) or 
gold (Ibrahim), and both eventually diversify their business interests 
to include drug trafficking, real estate, and arms dealing.2 Surprisingly 
little attention has been paid to the parallels between fictional character 
and existing crime boss; instead, scholars have zeroed in on the perhaps 
more obvious allegorical veins of Rushdie’s novel, particularly in terms 
of Moor’s artist mother Aurora and the means by which she reimagi-
nes India. Several scholars have analyzed the ways in which Aurora’s art 
depicting Moorish Spain, for example, acts as a “historical mirror” to 
Nehruvian secularism (Cundy 111) or is an allegorical representation 
of early modern India in which peaceful, harmonious multiculturalism 
rules (Narain). The destruction of Aurora’s art in the midst of communal 
violence has led others to read the novel as a pessimistic elegy to the de-
clining possibility of harmonious multiculturalism in India (Deszcz) or 
a cautionary tale about the valorization of cultural hybridity as a means 
of combatting the residual effects of colonial race and class prejudices 
(Cantor; Laouyene; Dohra Ahmad). 
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I acknowledge the value of this work but think it is crucial to shift 
critical tack in order to focus on Abraham as an entry point to under-
standing the novel’s engagement with contemporary global India. At 
the helm of India’s post-Independence thrust into modernity (punctu-
ated by the neoliberal economic policy reform of the 1980s and 1990s), 
Abraham straddles the line between Bombay’s sparkling upper class and 
its dark economic underbelly, which is characterized by increasing eco-
nomic disparity, organized criminal networks, and violent communal-
ism. Because any reading of The Moor’s Last Sigh must first recognize 
the ways in which it comments on the state of India after the publica-
tion Midnight’s Children, I contend that the former is best understood 
within the context of India’s emergence as a global economic power in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s. In this study, I argue that The Moor’s 
Last Sigh functions as Rushdie’s re-visitation of India and powerfully 
critiques contemporary Indian society. Yumna Siddiqi suggests that the 
novel, which exhibits key elements of the thriller genre, performs this 
critique by demonstrating, through an examination of the fascist ten-
dencies of Hindu nationalist politics, that “political society can and does 
take regressive forms” (1230). This essay recognizes and expands on this 
assertion to examine the ways in which Rushdie’s text identifies cor-
rosive effects of India’s open-market economy, particularly those aspects 
caused by an entrepreneurial class that stands to benefit most—politi-
cally and financially—from widening markets, an increased emphasis 
on privatization, and government corruption. 
Further, I argue that Rushdie represents Bombay’s economic under-
world as the true obstacle to cultural and democratic progress in post-
Independence India. More specifically, The Moor’s Last Sigh revises the 
portentious conclusion of Midnight’s Children, in which the protagonist, 
Saleem Sinai, is engulfed by India’s vast, multitudinous crowd, which he 
predicts will “make progress impossible” (Rushdie 532). In The Moor’s 
Last Sigh, India’s lack of progress toward achieving cultural and political 
harmony is not the fault of “the crowd” alone: the corrosive side effects 
of post-Independence economic policy, from the dirigiste intervention-
ism of the 1950s through the 1970s and liberalization in the 1980s 
and 1990s, has led to a drastic bifurcation of India’s richest and poor-
141
Neo l i b e r a l i sm’s  Ch i l d ren
est inhabitants as a consequence of both legitimate and illegal capitalist 
and political pursuits, often through the exploitation of an expanding 
sector of informal, “wageless” human capital. In this way, The Moor’s 
Last Sigh is a literary examination of India’s post-Independence cultural 
and political struggles against the backdrop of widening markets, trade 
liberalization, and growing domestic income inequality. 
I. India’s Economy: Independence (1947)—Structural Adjustment 
(1990–91)
As a Bombay native born in the year of India’s independence, Rushdie 
has witnessed the country’s rise out of the shackles of colonialism to a 
position of global economic power. The narrative of The Moor’s Last Sigh 
unfolds during the nation’s formative pre- and post-Independence years, 
during which the state initiated a break from colonially built economic 
scaffolding that was largely erected to serve foreign interests. Until 
Independence, the impact of modern industrialism in India had been 
limited almost entirely to the heavy importation of manufactured goods 
from abroad. Little had been done to promote domestic economic de-
velopment and domestic manufacturing was largely limited to textile 
production (Patel 334). As a result, India’s post-Independence economy 
bore the markings of classic dirigiste development: tight state control 
of infrastructure development and strategic industries; expansion and 
strengthening of the economy’s productive base; the nationalization of 
existing, and the establishment of new, financial institutions (including 
the Bank of India); and regulation and coordination of economic activ-
ity.3 “With roots in the freedom struggle itself ” (Chandrasekhar and 
Ghosh 3), India’s economic policy for the first three decades following 
Independence was characterized by a strong state interventionist role. 
The dirigiste model resulted in relatively stagnant growth. While the rest 
of the developing world experienced, on average, three percent growth 
per capita during the post-war period, India achieved less than half that 
figure due to intense regulation of private enterprise with, Gurcharan 
Das contends, “the most stringent price and production controls in the 
world” (4).4 Predictably, Das, the center/right-leaning former Chief 
Executive Officer of Proctor & Gamble turned journalist and writer, 
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identifies this period as one characterized by “the worst features of capi-
talism and socialism” instituted by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru 
and, later, his daughter, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (4). However, 
conditions soon shifted in favor of business elites. Moderate reform in 
the 1980s, specifically through the liberalization of imports—particu-
larly luxury goods, such as electronics and automobiles, to satiate the 
appetite of a fast-growing middle class—was accompanied by a reliance 
on external debt to support government-financed economic stimulus.5 
While these measures stimulated short-term growth, they ultimately 
led to a fiscal crisis and dramatic reform in the 1990s best described as 
starkly neoliberal in nature. As defined by David Harvey, neoliberalism 
has functioned since its emergence in the 1960s as 
a theory of political economic practices that proposes that 
human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individ-
ual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional 
framework characterized by strong private property rights, free 
markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and 
preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such prac-
tices. (2)
Economic policy reform in India followed just such a prescriptive pro-
cess around freedom and individualism and was characterized by the 
curtailed presence of the state in economic affairs, the liberalization of 
imports to provide the private sector with uninhibited access to foreign 
markets as well as to capital goods and raw materials in order to become 
more competitive in such markets, domestic deregulation in deference 
to market forces, greater access to international capital, both productive 
and financial, less overbearing tax policies and structures, and, under 
pressure from the International Monetary Fund, devaluation of the 
rupee.6 
The Moor’s Last Sigh effectively captures snapshots of India’s evolv-
ing economic climate. “Bombay was central,” reflects Moor, and “[t]he 
wealth of the country flowed through its exchanges, its ports” (Rushdie 
351). Bombay, one of India’s most modern cities, has in many ways been 
representative of the state’s ebbing influence on economic development 
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in India. As “the first Indian town to experience economic, technologi-
cal, and social changes associated with the growth of capitalism in India” 
(Patel 328), Bombay had already emerged as a “global city” by the time 
The Moor’s Last Sigh was published in 1995. Very much an example 
of what Saskia Sassen identifies as a “global city,” one of a handful of 
metropoles that have transformed under the auspices of global capital-
ism into “highly concentrated command points in the organization of 
the world economy” (3), Bombay has become a financial hub for one 
of the world’s fastest growing economies of the last quarter century and 
experienced a capitalist renaissance with increased investments in com-
munications and a service industry boom (Patel 336). Bombay is central 
in more ways than one: culturally, it stands out as India’s most cosmo-
politan city and in terms of demographics is an expression of the na-
tion’s eclectic cultural heritage. Moor is a veritable product of the city’s 
cultural history; as the son of a Jewish-Muslim father and Portuguese-
Catholic mother, he represents the zenith of India’s cultural eclecticism. 
In many ways, then, Bombay has represented the myriad possibili-
ties of global capitalism. Insofar as this narrative of Bombay’s rise to 
economic prominence benefitted a highly specific portion of the city’s 
population, the figure of the entrepreneur is central to what Das consid-
ers India’s “success story” (3). Throughout the novel, Abraham embodies 
the entrepreneurial zeitgeist of the reform era. Abraham is described as 
ambitious from his youth, a “genius in the making” (Rushdie, Moor’s 
81), and soon after taking over the da Gama Trading Company he initi-
ates an ambitious coup against one of India’s oldest business families, 
the House of Cashondeliveri, who are money-lenders with vast holdings 
in banking, land, ships, chemicals, and fish. In the process, he acquires 
holdings in some of Bombay’s most lucrative markets for just pennies 
on the dollar. Before long, he forges his empire by establishing the cor-
porate entity of Siodicorp, from which he diversifies, for example, into 
the Baby Softo Talcum Powder Company, which he envisions “taking 
on Johnson & Johnson in their home markets” (184). He also positions 
Siodicorp as a major player in the Khazana Bank International (KBI), 
“which by the end of the 1980s had become the first financial institu-
tion to rival the great Western banks in terms of assets and transactions” 
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(334). By doing so, Abraham—and, by extension, the Zogoiby family—
represent what Harvey identifies within the ubiquity of neoliberalism as 
a “rising class power” which has taken advantage of “entrepreneurial 
opportunities . . . and all manner of possibilities to buy cheap and sell 
dear, if not to actually corner markets in such a way as to build fortunes 
that can either extend horizontally . . . or be diversified into all manner 
of businesses . . . [including] financial services, real-estate development, 
and retailing” (34). Abraham builds his empire by capitalizing on the 
changing landscape of India’s economy. 
However, although Abraham functions as the novel’s avatar of en-
trepreneurship, his individual narrative suggests that India’s so-called 
success story comes at a price. As much as Abraham gains from widen-
ing domestic markets and an increased emphasis on privatization and 
entrepreneurial freedom, he is also the benefactor of widespread gov-
ernment corruption and a growing underground economy that allows 
him to diversify in darker, less savory directions. The novel’s depiction 
of corruption, often related cynically by Moor, is consistent with post-
reform realities; economists such as Chandrasekhar and Ghosh note 
that while state withdrawal from economic matters would necessarily 
reduce red tape and corruption by submitting to the “discipline of the 
market,” corruption and cronyism actually increased to unprecedented 
levels (Chandrasekhar and Ghosh 38). In both the pre- and post-liber-
alization eras, corruption has been so prevalent that it prompted former 
Indian Central Vigilance Commissioner N. Vittal to remark that “[w]
e seem to be living in an India where there is a scam in a week if not 
a scam a day” (17). While a full account of post-reform corruption is 
beyond the scope of this study, it is worth noting that The Moor’s Last 
Sigh remains alive to the propensity of government officials to look the 
other way during Abraham’s increasingly illicit enterprises, particularly 
those involving drug smuggling, financial trading, and eventually, land 
development and real estate. 
As Moor reflects on his father’s involvement in bribery and cor-
ruption scandals, it becomes increasingly apparent to him that “be-
neath [Abraham’s] glittering monetarist vision there existed a hidden 
layer of activity” (Rushdie, Moor’s 334). True to its name, Siodicorp 
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receives cash on the delivery of illicit goods, initially by lining “the 
imperial pockets” of the British Navy during World War II to pro-
tect Abraham’s western-bound spice shipments from German U-Boats 
(112). The Baby Softo Talcum Powder Company emerges as a thinly 
veiled front for an international cocaine smuggling operation; Moor 
intimates that “the white powder [Abraham] was interested in did not 
come from quarries in the Western Ghats, but found its way into se-
lected Baby Softo canisters by a highly unusual route .  .  . and exten-
sive and systematic bribery of policemen and other officials” (184). 
Even Siodicorp’s dealings with the KBI are illicit. Among the bank’s 
largest clients are “a number of gentlemen and organizations whose 
names were featured on the most-wanted and most-dangerous lists of 
every country in the free world ” (335). In addition to the KBI’s ex-
tensive measures to cover up and disguise such “shadow accounts,” the 
bank’s greatest enterprise involves the “financing and secret manufac-
ture ‘for certain oil-rich countries and their ideological allies’ of large-
scale nuclear weaponry” (335). 
It is also important to remember that Abraham’s story is not repre-
sentative of the broad-based effects of economic policy reform in India 
insofar as it conveys a sense of widespread prosperity, however illicitly 
acquired. In reality, economic development has been far more uneven 
and disjunctive; for the vast majority of urban dwellers, India’s economic 
gains have not unfolded in the form of a success story. In particular, neo-
liberal policy reform has accelerated the transformation of the city’s cul-
ture and class fabric in ways that suggest that it only entailed a change 
in the relationship between the state and the economy insofar as it rep-
resented a “change in the character of the association” (Chandrasekhar 
and Ghosh 38) in which the state increasingly intervened in the name of 
economic growth rather than matters of welfare. While the state increas-
ingly neglected basic obligations toward its citizens by failing to provide 
necessities such as housing, healthcare, education, and sanitation, “state 
actions remained crucial to the ways in which the markets functioned 
and the ability of capital to pursue its different goals” (38). In other 
words, India’s shifting economic landscape represented more of a re-
structuring in which the mechanisms supporting welfare expenditure 
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were phased out in deference to those ensuring economic growth in the 
global capitalist economy. 
Such uneven development has been well documented in post-Inde-
pendence Bombay, particularly in the latter half of the twentieth cen-
tury. Income stagnation, especially among those who occupy the lowest 
rungs of the socio-economic ladder, has become the norm even as richer 
segments of India’s population have benefited from liberalization.7 In 
many cases, rising inequality has become nearly synonymous with rising 
unemployment and a rapidly expanding informal sector. For example, 
unemployment in Bombay doubled between 1981 and 1996. During 
a similar period (1981–91), the informal sector increased from an esti-
mated 55% of the city’s population to 65.6% of the population (Patel 
335). Such realities lurk in the background throughout The Moor’s Last 
Sigh, and although Moor’s narration emanates strictly from the com-
fortable cloisters of Bombay’s most privileged classes, the text permits 
key glimpses into Abraham’s encounters—often a consequence of illegal 
business dealings—with Bombay’s underclass. 
II. Wageless Life: Neoliberalism and Abraham’s Invisible Workforce 
If Abraham’s involvement in organized crime obliquely connects him to 
Ibrahim, a figure that continues to loom large in the collective imagina-
tion of Bombayites, both his prosperity and his façade as a legitimate 
businessman greatly depend on the city’s underclass. The complicated 
topography of Bombay’s economic underworld, however, suggests the 
grave inadequacy of “underworld” as an accurate descriptor of illegal 
capitalist ventures that are, in many instances, controlled from above. 
For Suketu Mehta, “underworld” is not just inaccurate but wrong: 
[I]t implies something hidden, something beneath. In Bombay, 
the underworld is the overworld; it is somehow suspended above 
this world and can come down to strike any time it chooses. 
The hit men refer to the operational centers of the gangs—
Karachi, Dubai, Malaysia—as upar—“above,” and Bombay as 
neeche, “below.” There can be nothing under “below.” (134; 
italics in original) 
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From “above,” Abraham exploits vulnerable, underemployed wage labor-
ers “below” to illegally construct his corporate headquarters. Drawing 
on a pool of recently arrived, destitute migrants proves an economical 
business practice; because they arrived following a recent census, “they 
were deemed not to exist,” a status that allows the city to “[bear] no re-
sponsibility for their housing and welfare” (Rushdie, Moor’s 186). While 
Abraham pays them a pittance, he revels in the city’s paltry labor laws, 
reflecting that “naturally we accepted no responsibility in case of ill-
health or injury. . . . After all, these people were not just invisible, but 
actually, according to official pronouncements, simply not at all there” 
(187). 
The image of the invisible, excluded slum-dweller recurs throughout 
the text, arising variously as “an invisible reality mov[ing] phantomwise 
beneath a visible fiction” (184), the “invisible world” (213), “invisible 
shacks of the invisible poor” (248), and even as “Abraham’s invisible 
city, built by invisible people to do invisible deeds” (335). That these 
spectral figures are foregrounded in a narrative otherwise told from the 
perspective of Bombay’s cosmopolitan elite indicates Rushdie’s aware-
ness of the material consequences of neoliberal ideology in practice in 
modern India. This is not to suggest, however, that the materialization of 
Bombay’s urban poor neatly parallels the gradual implementation of ne-
oliberal economic policy. In Midnight’s Children, for example, Saleem is 
keenly aware of an invisible poor that existed even before Independence. 
He describes his mother—prior to his birth—entering “causeways 
where poverty eats away the tarmac like a drought, where people lead 
their invisible lives” (89). It is this passage that leads Caroline Herbert 
to conclude that The Moor’s Last Sigh offers new ways of understanding 
the invisible lives of which Rushdie was keenly aware in his earlier novel 
or what she considers the “spectrality” of the excluded urban subject. 
Hebert deploys the term spectrality in the Derridean sense, as “a ‘pros-
thetic body’ that bears witness to a subject exploited or excluded by 
the flows of global capitalism” (947), and suggests that Rushdie’s text 
offers ways to read both for and from the perspective of spectral urban 
dwellers in the 1980s and 1990s. The city’s “toiling bodies become the 
site of such paradoxical corporeality, at once rendered invisible by the 
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city they labor to bring into material existence and subject to .  .  . its 
most ethnic violence” (948). While I will return to the role of ethnic 
violence in the exacerbation of widespread class struggle, the former 
notion of simultaneous inclusion and exclusion in the city’s capitalist 
transformation offers a useful explanation of the role Abraham’s invis-
ible workforce plays in building a city which is ultimately, for all of their 
efforts, inaccessible. 
However, while identifying the spectrality of those that comprise 
Abraham’s invisible workforce helps highlight certain subjugated sub-
ject positions, I propose an alternative critical framework that offers a 
systemic understanding of Bombay’s exploited urban subjects and their 
origins in the fluctuating economic and cultural climates of contempo-
rary India. Unaccounted for by the state, they represent what Michael 
Denning refers to as “wageless life,” a type of existence that has given rise 
to an “informal sector” external to normative conceptions of economic 
infrastructure. Notions of the “informal economies” and “informal sec-
tors” arising in developing countries were originally outlined by devel-
opment economist Keith Hart in the 1970s and refer to those who make 
their living through self-employment as opposed to officially-recognized 
wage earning. While the informal sector, Denning observes, can arise 
from over-regulation or impotent central governance, it resides within 
“the logic of post-colonial capitalist accumulation” as a consequence of 
the failure to develop “inherited colonial labor apparatuses” (90) accord-
ing to the traditional dual economy model, which normalizes employ-
ment and unemployment as categories indicative of economic health.8 
Moreover, Denning points out that the discourse from which concep-
tions of the informal economy emerged “saw it as a normal—indeed 
under neoliberalism, expanding—sphere of economic activity” (90). 
Alienating pre-existing capitalist infrastructure, in place during coloni-
zation and conducive to the “informal” accumulation of capital, informs 
current iterations of wageless life under the auspices of global capitalism. 
Understanding Abraham’s invisibles as a lived example of “wageless 
life,” materially excluded from the normative infrastructure of India’s 
formal economy, is useful insofar as it accounts for the relation of the 
spectral urban underclass to India’s changing economic policies. In 
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Denning’s view, “the only thing worse than being exploited is not being 
exploited” (79). He suggests that, for the city’s marginalized population, 
inclusion in normative economic infrastructures, however unfair, is 
preferable to exclusion. His reasoning stems partially from the possibil-
ity of unionization and increased protections through grassroots mobi-
lization. Denning sees hope in organizations such as the Self-Employed 
Women’s Association (SEWA), a union in Gujarat formed on behalf 
of self-employed ragpickers, food vendors, and textile workers (91). 
Although Abraham pays his workers “small amounts of cash” for their 
labor (Rushdie, Moor’s 187), no such prospects exist for them within the 
context of the novel. On the contrary, any hope for representation grows 
bleaker with the death of Moor’s sister Mynah, a labor rights advocate 
and Marxist who is eventually killed by a chemical leak while visiting 
a factory to investigate the maltreatment of female workers from the 
slums. In one of the darkest revelations of the novel, Moor discovers 
that an investigation “concluded that the incident had been a deliberate 
attack on Mynah’s organization by ‘unnamed outside agents’” and that 
“a few months previously Mynah had finally succeeded in sending Keke 
Kolatkar to jail for his property swindles” (276). Abraham, connected 
to Kolatkar through their mutual land-grab ventures, bears partial re-
sponsibility for the murder of his own daughter, which was carried out 
to protect his unethical source of wage labor. 
The Moor’s Last Sigh remains bound to the hopelessness of wageless 
life through the end of the novel. As Liza Weinstein notes, the major-
ity of violence perpetrated during the 1992–93 riots that led up to the 
1993 bombings was carried out by “angry young men,” an out-of-work 
male population mobilized and exploited by the Shiv Sena and similar 
Hindu nationalist organizations to perpetuate, often violently, Hindu 
nationalist agendas (28). Yet the possibility remains that the same sec-
tarian energies harnessed by the Shiv Sena may be redirected for posi-
tive change, at least theoretically. Denning, for example, is careful to 
bundle his conception of wageless life with Franz Fanon’s resurrection 
of Karl Marx’s term lumpenproletariat, originally understood as a derelict 
population existing hierarchically beneath the proletariat collective and 
unlikely to experience class mobility. The lumpenproletariat exists for 
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Fanon within “new urban populations of the Third World” (Denning 
87) and, as a “cohort of starving men, divorced from tribe and clan, 
constitutes one of the most spontaneously and radically revolutionary 
forces of a colonized people” (Fanon qtd. in Denning 88). Reimagined 
thus, the revolutionary potential of the wageless “invisibles” suggests 
that any radical shift in conditions for India’s underclass lies in the hands 
of “the crowd.”9 
III. The World’s Largest Slums: Organized Crime, Corruption, and 
Bombay’s Underground Economy
If any part of “the crowd’s” revolutionary potential has been fulfilled, 
however, it has occurred in the form of an insurrection against law and 
order, if only for economic gain. India’s thriving underground economy 
was, at its earliest, a product of vast squatter collectives assembled at the 
margins of the city. As a consequence of the industrial development that 
followed Independence—namely, the textile boom—an unprecedented 
number of unskilled workers flooded Bombay in search of employment 
(Patel 334). The result was rapid, if slipshod, urbanization; in many 
cases, worker housing built by factory owners and public officials prior 
to Independence proved vastly inadequate. State-led plans to expand 
housing and basic services for this growing population were essentially 
non-existent and, due to an effort to curtail urban expansion, often re-
sembled willful neglect on the part of public officials (Weinstein 26). 
Consequently large portions of the city’s skyrocketing population found 
refuge in slum neighborhoods, often with little or no access to basic ser-
vices. Between 1951 and 1991, Bombay’s population more than tripled 
from 2.9 million to 9.9 million (Patel 338); during the same period 
of time, slum populations also grew. In 1971, twenty percent of the 
city’s 5.9 million residents lived in the slums; in 1985, slum-dwellers 
made up over half of the city’s 9 million residents. Today, less than half 
of the city’s population has legal tenure of the land on which they live 
(339–40).
Arjun Appadurai, a Bombay native who documents “spectral hous-
ing” in the space-starved city, reflects that “[i]t is a banality to say that 
housing is scarce in Bombay” (“Spectral” 635). He recalls palpable 
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change in Bombay during the 1970s and describes “a malignant city 
[that] began to emerge from beneath the surface of the cosmopolitan 
ethos of the prior period. . . . Jobs became harder to get. More rural ar-
rivals in the city found themselves economic refugees. Slums and shacks 
began to proliferate” (629). For Appadurai, this signals a malformation 
inherent in the development of the global cultural economy he describes 
as a “complex, overlapping, disjunctive order” (“Disjuncture” 296) in 
which the deterritorialization of culture and class production is the new 
norm (301).10 Such disjuncture appears multiple times in Rushdie’s 
novel, not only in Abraham’s exploitation of the “invisibles” to build 
his glittering corporate skyscrapers, but also in Aurora’s artistic career 
as she “zoom[s] around the . .  . town in her famous curtained Buick” 
and “ventur[es] alone into the slum-city of Dharavi” (Moor’s 129). Even 
Moor’s upbringing is sprinkled with encounters with the city’s less af-
fluent spaces and characters. Aurora employs Lambajan Chandiwala as 
the family gatekeeper, thus saving him from “the worst, gutter-dwelling, 
begging-bowl consequences” of slum life (135). His wife, Miss Jaya Hé, 
is Moor’s ayah and introduces him to street-level Bombay and all of 
its “compacted humanity, being pushed so tightly together that privacy 
ceased to exist and the boundaries of yourself began to dissolve” (193). 
Such increased proximity between rich and poor in an already bulging 
city represents the changing dynamics of a metropolis in flux. 
While post-Independence Bombay was bursting at its seams, many 
recently arrived inhabitants found work harder and harder to come by, 
particularly in the textile industry. Following a period of moderniza-
tion and automation, mass layoffs and strikes in 1982–83 resulted in 
the shuttering of a number of mills and a sharp rise in unemployment 
despite an increase in overall productivity. City unemployment trends 
were staggering: while twenty-seven percent of the city’s population 
found work in the textile industry in 1976, for example, by 1991 the 
figure was less than half that (Patel 334–35). Placed alongside Bombay’s 
burgeoning service and financial sectors, Bombay’s unemployment crisis 
has been indicative of a significant gulf between a new business class 
and the majority of Bombay’s unskilled and skilled laborers.11 In The 
Moor’s Last Sigh, this division is most starkly apparent in the relationship 
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between Abraham and the “invisibles.” While neoliberalism and Indian 
economics have represented a new dynamic in the marriage between the 
state and the market, the results have not been happy for the majority 
of Bombay’s inhabitants. 
Abraham controls his empire from the sprawling halls and sweeping 
balconies of the Zogoiby estate, Elephanta, and the glittering facade of 
Cashnodeliveri Tower, and these are the locations from which Moor 
narrates. His position is especially powerful considering the proxim-
ity of the Zogoiby family to Bombay’s organized criminal underworld. 
Many of Bombay’s organized criminal operations grew out of the city’s 
struggle with housing. In particular, their paternalistic tradition of prof-
fering housing and basic services to a rapidly expanding population of 
underemployed slum-dwellers engendered support and allowed them to 
flourish. During the first few decades of national independence, hous-
ing crises and land shortages resulted in a wealth of opportunities for 
enterprising slumlords. Varadarajan Mudaliar, known on the street as 
Vardhabhai, was one of the first to take advantage; he built his crimi-
nal organization, based on alcohol trafficking in the industrial slum of 
Dharvi, in the 1960s. Because there were no policy plans in place to 
account for the growing population of squatters, Vardhabhai used brib-
ery to ensure the perpetuation of the slums both as a safe haven for 
his liquor business as well as a loyal neighborhood support network. 
In many cases, slumlords succeeded in illegally securing access to basic 
services for slum inhabitants, including water, cooking fuel, and ration 
cards. These acquisitions encouraged tight community bonds based on 
loyalty. 12 
In the late 1970s and 1980s, organized criminal groups began to 
strengthen ties to political parties, often by forming alliances with 
ethnic political movements such as the Shiv Sena (Weinstein 28). While 
the Sena began as a linguistic movement on behalf of Marathi-speaking 
citizens, the group renewed itself in the 1980s as a religiously oriented 
movement and a political party aligned with the protection of Hindu 
rights. However, according to Sujata Patel, “the Shiv Sena’s latent intent 
was to promote the economic regime that was emerging in the city 
through globalization” (342). The Sena created a “culture of depriva-
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tion” within various slum neighborhoods and exploited uneven eco-
nomic development in Bombay by encouraging the growth of an already 
expansive informal economy. Assuming a patriarchal, mafia-cum-slum 
lord role, the Sena supported the establishment of petty businesses by 
providing and financing fast food stalls, for example, or consumer goods 
for resale on the street. This often resulted in extortion and protection 
rackets that meant the Sena was able to collect licensing commissions 
through local municipal officials aligned with the party. These activities 
were part of the broader dada culture that emerged during the middle- 
and upper-class housing boom of the 1970s. Each dada—which means 
“elder brother” in Marathi but colloquially denotes “Mafia don” in 
Bombay—was able to “encroach [on] land both for constructing slum 
settlements and for selling it to builders” (Patel 343). These operations 
were dependent on violence or the threat of such and led to local neigh-
borhood branches, or shakhas, led by local chiefs and concerned with 
social and economic aspects of life (Patel 344). One of the most signifi-
cant aspects of dada culture for the Shiv Sena and other organizations, 
however, involves the sense of identity it provided young, unemployed 
males in the slums. By tapping a populist base, the Sena has been able to 
encourage violence to achieve political ends (Patel 342–43). 
On the surface, Shiv Sena cultural politics have existed opposite 
Abraham’s capitalist individualism. And yet, as Weinstein insists, “the 
growth of such a chauvinist movement in Bombay should be seen in 
context with trends in the country at large as well as in terms of the city’s 
changing economy” (330). In The Moor’s Last Sigh, Raman “Mainduck” 
Fielding functions as a dada figure within just such a unique, if con-
tradictory, context. A cartoonish caricature of the Sena’s founder Bal 
Thackeray, Fielding—leader of Mumbai’s Axis, a parody of the Sena—
harbors a keen ideological opposition to the economic plight of his core 
constituency: “[H]e was against unions, in favour of breaking strikes . . . 
against poverty and in favour of wealth” (Rushdie, Moor’s 298) and he 
“derided the Marxist analysis of society as a class struggle and lauded the 
Hindu preference for the eternal stability of the caste” (299). His aver-
sion to social mobility does not, however, prevent him from breaking 
from the core polytheistic tenets of Hinduism in order to promote the 
154
Mat the w  S .  Hen r y
primacy of the Lord Rama; he unites his followers under a “single, mar-
tial deity, a single book, and mob rule” (338). Like existing dada culture, 
Fielding strives for the perpetuation rather than abolition of the societal 
hierarchies from which he derives power in the evolving economic logic 
of Bombay. 
While Fielding and Mumbai’s Axis represent, in some ways, the cor-
rosive effects of late capitalism, The Moor’s Last Sigh does not exonerate 
Hindu nationalist politics as a systemic disease but instead suggests a 
shared culpability for negative implications of neoliberal policy reform 
that are, at their core, uniquely Indian. Similarly, Thomas Blom Hansen 
cautions against understanding Hindu nationalism and xenophobic 
politics “as anomalies inflicted by dark forces or structures of peripheral 
capitalism” (9). He argues that the Shiv Sena represents a possibility 
“always folded into India’s unique experience of modernity and democ-
racy” (9). This is an important distinction, for while it is tempting to 
assign external blame for internal problems—that is, to blame global 
capitalism for Hindu-Muslim violence—Hindu nationalist politics had 
been, until the last three or four decades, a dormant but entirely real 
possibility. 
By the time the Shiv Sena was beginning to win its most decisive 
political victories in the early 1990s, property development had become 
a boon for criminal outfits such as D-Company, which had begun to 
abandon smuggling because of the increased competition for foreign 
consumer goods that resulted from market liberalization and the de-
regulation of imports (Weinstein 25). By this time, organized crimi-
nal networks were investing in Bombay’s suddenly lucrative property 
market; however, community and political links continued to play a 
vital role in land and property development enterprises. In particular, 
high land prices and strict municipal regulation of land development 
presented an opportunity for organized criminal networks such as 
D-Company because of government officials “particularly open to cor-
ruption” (Weinstein 31). 
While land development can be equated to prosperity for Abraham 
and Ibrahim, however, it has also meant increased access to a marginal-
ized population easily exploited for political gain. In some cases, this 
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has exacerbated existing intercultural rifts. As noted above, for exam-
ple, the Shiv Sena took advantage of its strong community ties during 
mass textile layoffs by leveraging the “seemingly endless supply of angry 
young men” (Weinstein 28) into advantageous political action. During 
the Hindu-Muslim riots of 1992–93, the party used populist rhetoric 
to mobilize angry mobs to target Muslim homes and businesses. In a 
different vein, D-Company’s decidedly sectarian terrorist response was 
likely financed through earnings from illegal property development 
schemes that had been occurring since the early 1990s. A message al-
legedly sent by Ibrahim on behalf of Bombay Muslims following the 
bombings read: “Don’t mess with us” (qtd. in Hansen 125). A chilling 
analog appears in The Moor’s Last Sigh: Moor, reflecting on the depth 
of his father’s involvement in international crime and terrorism, sus-
pects the manufacture of a “so-called Islamic bomb” or “invisible bomb” 
(Rushdie 341, 335)—perhaps an oblique analogy for the coming explo-
sion of communal violence amongst the urban poor. Moor senses the 
foreboding apotheosis of Abraham’s continued liaisons with Bombay’s 
criminal underworld. 
By the time Moor witnesses the bomb’s detonation, he has become a 
reluctant participant in the city’s underworld. Although his participa-
tion has been aligned on both sides of the Hindu-Muslim divide, it is 
not entirely clear who benefits from the bombings: 
Many of Abraham’s enemies were hit—policemen, MA cadres, 
criminal rivals . . . [Abraham] in the hour of his annihilation 
made a phone call, and the metropolis began to explode. But 
could even Abraham, with his immense resources, have stock-
piled such an arsenal? How could gang warfare explain the 
legion of innocent dead? Hindu and Muslim areas were both 
attacked: men, women, and children perished. (372)
Moor suspects his father but confronts the impossibility of assigning 
blame or delineating aggressor from innocent victim. Sectarian animosi-
ties originate from the depths of Indian history such that allocating blame 
is as impossible for Moor as envisioning progress is for Saleem. Moor 
himself stumbles upon this bleak epiphany as well: “Maybe Abraham 
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lit the fuse, or Scar: these fanatics or those, our crazies or yours.  .  .  . 
We were both the bombers and the bombs” (Rushdie, Moor’s 372). For 
Moor, the question of blame is not important; culpability is ubiquitous. 
Even Abraham is killed in the bombings. Those who carry out the at-
tacks detonate an additional bomb in his high-rise headquarters, and his 
last words amount to a final, enigmatic command from atop his perch: 
“Evacuate the building” (375). 
IV. Expanding Culpability: The Moor’s Last Sigh as a Critique of 
Indian Society
The Bombay bombings, and Moor’s perceived complicity, ultimately 
drive him from India to Spain in search of his mother’s magnum opus, 
“The Moor’s Last Sigh,” wherein resides the final trace of his mother’s 
hopes for India. The painting is housed in the fictional Spanish village 
of Benengeli under the care of Aurora’s hated former colleague, Vasco 
Miranda; however, Miranda destroys the painting and Moor, in his 
grief, kills him. The novel closes as a fugitive Moor rests in a derelict 
graveyard in the Spanish countryside, sighing: “I’ll lay me down upon this 
graven stone . . . and close my eyes . . . and hope to awaken, renewed and 
joyful, into a better time” (433–34; emphasis in original). The epitaph 
presents a subtle irony: although Moor sees untold horror in India, he 
escapes easily and leaves behind a volatile Bombay that, in the follow-
ing years, witnesses continuing Hindu-Muslim clashes. That Rushdie’s 
characters have been able to exercise class power in order to escape such 
difficulties is not a particularly new observation. Critics have questioned 
the power of The Satanic Verses as a critique of cultural and racial issues 
in the migrant neighborhoods of post-imperial London because of the 
novel’s circumvention or even silencing of migrant voices in deference 
to Rushdie’s prescriptive aesthetics of hybridity (Kalliney; Gane). Such 
a tendency could be indicative of a larger deficiency within Rushdie’s 
work in which his cosmopolitan status is detrimental to his portrayal of 
marginalized postcolonial subjects. 
Dohra Ahmad suggests that Aurora’s artistic difficulties in India’s 
contemporary sectarian climate are a fictionalized representation of 
Rushdie’s own experience with The Satanic Verses. The same could be said 
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for The Moor’s Last Sigh’s carefully crafted commentary on the complic-
ity of well-educated urban elites in Bombay’s class disparity and cultural 
clashes.13 While Abraham and the Shiv Sena are depicted as part and 
parcel of global capitalism’s most egregious crimes against India’s un-
derclass, for example, Abraham’s employment of Adam Braganza serves 
as Rushdie’s meta-critical lament of a wayward generation. Born in the 
final pages of Midnight’s Children as Saleem Sinai’s illegitimate son, 
Adam represents his father’s hope for “a second generation of magical 
children who would grow up far tougher than the first” (Rushdie 515). 
Instead, Adam pursues the capitalist dream, selling Braganza Pickles, 
the business owned by Mary Pereira, Saleem’s ayah and only remaining 
family at the end of Midnight’s Children. The company’s “huge export 
potential” with the Indian diaspora is enough to entice him to unload 
the business (Moor’s 342). Saleem views the business and its core compe-
tency of pickling as representing the importance of “the chutnification 
of history” (Midnight’s Children 529) which, though necessarily distort-
ing historical narrative, underscores the importance of India’s history to 
its present cultural dynamics. Thus relieved of history, Adam begins to 
feverishly modernize Siodicorp through the installation of computers, 
cable, fiber-optics, and telecommunications. Moor reflects that “[t]he 
future had arrived” and, led by Adam, “[t]here was a generation waiting 
to inherit the earth, caring nothing for old-timers’ concern . . . it was 
the birth of a new age in India, when money, as well as religion, was 
breaking all the shackles on its desires” (Moor’s 343–44). Dazzled by 
Adam, Abraham adopts him as his second son, Adam Zogoiby (349). 
Yet, for all his promise as a member of India’s tougher, more independ-
ent second generation of midnight’s children, Adam’s unabashed mone-
tary indiscretions ultimately bring Siodicorp—and Abraham—crashing 
down. Initially charged with “bribing central government ministers 
[for] crore upon crore of public exchequer funds, with which he actually 
intended to fix the Bombay Stock Exchange itself ” (359), Adam re-
veals to investigators his involvement—and by extension, Abraham’s or-
chestration—of “vast global fraud perpetrated by the chiefs of Khazana 
Bank International, of the disappearance of assets into so-called ‘black 
holes’, and of its alleged involvement with terrorist organizations” (360). 
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Although Adam represents India’s hopes for the future in the concluding 
pages of Midnight’s Children, his downfall in The Moor’s Last Sigh posi-
tions him as just another member of the corrupt urban elite. 
The trajectory of Aurora’s artistic career suggests a similar disconnect 
between artistic projects invested in the aesthetics and political valence 
of hybridity and the lived realities of post-Independence India. For all of 
the good intentions behind Aurora’s artistic reimagining of India as a site 
of harmonious multiculturalism, Abraham’s role as her primary patron 
creates a crisis of legitimacy for her artistic vision. Abraham’s ventures 
undoubtedly push India in a direction opposite that of Aurora’s utopian 
artistic dreams and deeper into violence, depravity, and the mindless 
accumulation of capital. Yet she seems to know it all along. Abraham’s 
liaison with India’s underworld is a necessary evil in which she is a par-
ticipant: “Aurora knew,” Moor reflects, that “she needed Abraham, she 
needed him to take care of business and leave her free for art” (223). He 
realizes that Aurora is not merely disinterested when she stops listening 
and covers her ears as Abraham boasts about his business models: “[H]
ers was a chosen blindness, her complicity the complicity of silence” 
(107). While Adam is an active participant in Abraham’s corrupt busi-
ness empire, Aurora is willfully ignorant of its nature. 
Even if Aurora’s support network was legitimate, however, her status 
in the upper reaches of India’s class hierarchy would likely call into ques-
tion her claims as a serious artist concerned with the crises of India’s 
social fabric. Instead, her wealth and fame allow her to enact a sort of 
socio-economic voyeurism in which she is free to brush up against the 
lived struggles of those most affected by seismic shifts in pre- and post-
Independence Indian politics. During the Royal Indian Navy mutiny 
of 1946, for example, in which a strike and revolt by twenty thousand 
Indian sailors of the Royal Indian Navy against British rule was called 
off due to lack of political support, Aurora, “a lady with a sketchbook 
and a folding stool” (132), leaps driverless into her Buick and speeds 
for the naval base to artistically document the historical moment. She 
is quickly surrounded by a crowd of “frustrated young men . . . in filthy 
moods” and sullen about the aborted revolt, but she is able to escape, 
saved when she is recognized as a famous artist. Perhaps most telling is 
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her reply when a sailor asks her to tell her “Congress friends” that he 
had been let down: “I will” (134).14 Aurora’s vantage point is one of 
wealthy, comfortable isolation from Bombay’s street-level realities, and 
for much of the novel she remains in her studio in Elephanta, free to 
voice her opinions on religion, politics, and social welfare without fear 
of retribution. 
Moor’s ability to escape Bombay just as his father’s capitalist empire 
begins to crumble; Adam Braganza’s rise to affluence and power within 
the corporate behemoth of Siodicorp; Aurora’s comfortable perch in her 
studio, free to pursue her art above the fray of everyday Bombay: each 
of these narratives, not to mention Abraham’s own “success” story, are 
redolent of the type of individualism and entrepreneurial freedom that 
characterized neoliberal policy reform in India in the early 1990s. Even 
Fielding’s reformulation of Hinduism is a matter of self-invention for po-
litical and economic gain. Yet each, in its own way, benefited from or exac-
erbated the city’s class disparities and intercultural violence that continue 
to inhibit the type of progress conducive to the harmonious multicultur-
alism envisioned in Aurora’s art and which could permit writers such as 
Rushdie to speak at literary festivals and travel freely throughout India. 
Saleem’s prediction at the conclusion of Midnight’s Children continues 
to be legitimated in real, lived, and new ways every day, and obstacles 
to cultural and class progress in India apparently continue to loom large 
in Rushdie’s mind. Two months after the Jaipur incident, he was able to 
return to India to speak at the India Today Conclave 2012 where, in-
cidentally, his attendance prompted Imran Khan, a Pakistani politician 
and former friend of Rushdie’s, to cancel his trip and leave a slot open 
for Rushdie to serve as a keynote speaker. Rushdie did not waste the 
opportunity to rebuke Khan, who has in the past remarked disdainfully 
about the “immeasurable hurt” Rushdie caused Muslims by writing The 
Satanic Verses:
In the real world, Muslims in both Pakistan and India suffer 
from enormous economic hardship, from bad education and 
shortage of opportunities. The repressive consequences of 
Islamic extremism on women and of mullah-driven politics on 
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the freedom of the citizens; these things are what Muslims ac-
tually face in the real world. And Imran Khan would do well to 
speak of the “immeasurable hurt” caused by these things, and 
not take the demagogue’s route of choosing instead to demon-
ize a book written 25 years ago, and making its author a bogey-
man with which to distract his audience from the “immeasur-
able hurt” of their actual lives. (“Liberty Verses”)
Though Rushdie speaks specifically about Muslims, the same could be 
said for India’s majority Hindu population, particularly in Bombay. 
Regardless, Rushdie’s sentiments remain consistent: while Muslim at-
titudes toward him remain largely unchanged, his address continues 
the critique of modern India initiated in Midnight’s Children and taken 
up in The Moor’s Last Sigh. The impossibility of progress, cultural or 
otherwise, frequently stems from suboptimal economic conditions that 
have and continue to exacerbate existing cultural tensions in India. If 
progress is to be made, if the “immeasurable hurt” caused by an irre-
sponsible economic infrastructure and enacted against wageless life is 
to be ameliorated, it must begin with a focus on common plight rather 
than cultural difference. 
Notes
 1 Burke reports that Indian officials feared action by Ibrahim, who they believe 
was “closely linked to the Pakistani security establishment”; others thought, 
however, that an assassination was highly unlikely and that “the row was started 
by unscrupulous Indian politicians” in response to outcry from conservative 
Muslim clerics. Either way, twenty-five years after the publication of The Satanic 
Verses, Rushdie remains a controversial figure in the Muslim world and continues 
to experience backlash. 
 2 For a thorough account of Ibrahim’s rise to power and D-Company’s continued 
operations, consult Clarke 46–66. 
 3 Dirigisme is an economic system characterized by strong state control over in-
vestment and economic planning. A concept that emerged in the post-war era 
to describe the French economy, dirigisme in India has been incorrectly under-
stood as the crisis that necessitated structural adjustment in 1990–91. However, 
several argue that the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank played 
a key role in pushing India towards structural adjustment (Chandrasekhar and 
Patnaik 3002).
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 4 India’s post-Independence economic policy can be distinguished from the post-
war project of “embedded liberalism,” an ethos designed to avoid another De-
pression-era downturn. State policy in many developed and developing nations 
was dually interested in preserving the pre-war impetus for private investment 
while surrounding economic process with “a web of social and political con-
straints and a regulatory environment that sometimes restrained but otherwise 
led the way to economic and industrial strategy” (Harvey 11). 
 5 For an overview of initial steps toward neoliberalism as well as the Indian econ-
omy’s partial recovery in the 1980s, see Chandrasekhar and Ghosh 9–18. 
 6 For an overview of India’s liberalization-era policy reform in 1990–91, see Chan-
drasekhar and Ghosh 19–30. 
 7 Pal and Ghosh provide a thorough overview of trends in income and consump-
tion inequality leading up to and after the liberalization period of the early 
1990s. 
 8 For an account of the normalization of unemployment against the normative 
category of employment, see Denning 81–86. 
 9 As Aijaz Ahmad notes, Marx’s opinions on India, however underdeveloped, led 
him to suggest that the revolutionary rise of India’s proletariat was unlikely with-
out the prior realization of socialist revolution or reform in Great Britain (236). 
 10 Appadurai argues that deterritorialization is “one of the central forces of the 
modern world, since it brings laboring populations into the lower class sectors 
and spaces of relatively wealthy societies, while sometimes creating exaggerated 
and intensified senses of criticism or attachment to politics in the home-state” 
(“Disjuncture” 301). In the case of Bombay, the latter has been realized in the 
mobilization of a marginalized Hindu population by Hindu nationalist organi-
zations for political ends. 
 11 As Patel notes, “[e]ven when income and earnings have risen, basic conditions 
of work and living environment[s] have not changed for many of Mumbai’s 
citizens” and this disparity extends into access to land and housing, education, 
health, and environmental integrity (337). 
 12 For an overview of the criminal origins of land development in Bombay, see 
Weinstein 22–39. 
 13 Dohra Ahmad observes: 
  Aurora’s painting “The Kissing of Abbas Ali Baig,” a Breughalesque “state-
of-India painting” . . . illustrates [the process of reductive reading] when 
Raman Fielding and his followers impose upon it a single, definitive anti-
Hindu political reading. If we engage in so tedious a decoding as to locate 
a figure for The Satanic Verses anywhere in The Moor’s Last Sigh, it would 
certainly be this painting, which becomes an ideological burden for Au-
rora. (12) 
 14 Scenes like this, dispersed throughout the narrative, lead Laouyene to conclude 
that “[r]ather than rubbing shoulders with India’s downtrodden and fighting 
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against its caste hierarchies and class injustices, [Aurora] surrounds herself with 
a coterie of Bombay’s sophisticated and upper-class dilettantes” (157).
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